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INTRODUCTION
Spring of 2009: Captain Heather Ortiz was admitted to Evans Army
Community Hospital to deliver her baby.' When doctors carelessly
administered drugs to Captain Ortiz, it prevented her baby, I.0.2, from
receiving enough oxygen while in the womb, resulting in brain trauma
that caused cerebral palsy to I.0. 3 Additionally, doctors failed to properly
monitor I.O.'s heart monitor, adding to the severity of the injuries
incurred.4 The Tenth Circuit denied compensation and a petition for Writ
of Certiorari is pending with the Supreme Court.5
Under the 65 year long-standing Feres Doctrine, service members
cannot sue the Government for injuries incurred incident to active duty
service.6 The Feres Doctrine has created harsh results, perhaps results
not even contemplated by the Supreme Court or even Congress and it has
also received a large amount of criticism over the years.7 Some critics
have proposed to revise the Feres Doctrine, while other critics have even
proposed to eliminate the Feres Doctrine. Despite the criticism, most
I Ortiz v. U.S. ex rel. Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 818 (10th Cir. 2015)
petition for cert. filed October 19, 2015.
2 The court used 1.0. in the case to refer to Captain Ortiz's child instead of the first
name for privacy considerations.
3 Id. at 819.
4 Id.
Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 819.
6 See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (denying tort claimants
relief under the FTCA, thus, creating the "Feres Doctrine"). "Active Duty" is a very
broad term and does not only refer to when military personnel have been deployed. While
on active duty, military personnel serve the Country 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for the
complete duration of their service commitment, unless on rest and relaxation "leave". See
About the Army, U.S. ARMY, http://www.goarmy.com/about/serving-in-the-army/serve-
your-way/active-duty.html (last visited April 11, 2016).
Id.; see also Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 818 (recognizing the unfairness of the Feres
Doctrine); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the "widespread, almost universal
criticism" it has received).
8 Major Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine,
192 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 60 (2007); see also Major Howard L. Donaldson, Constitutional Torts
and Military Effectiveness: A Proposed Alternative to the Feres Doctrine, 23 A.F. L.
Rev. 171, 205 (1983).
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courts continue to expand the Feres Doctrine instead of limiting its
application.
Part I of this note will examine the beginning of the Feres Doctrine,
the original intent of the doctrine, and how the Court interpreted the
FTCA in Feres. Part II of this note will examine how the Feres Doctrine
has been applied to third parties and the parallel application to cases
involving in utero tort claims. Part II of the note will also analyze the
circuit split cases involving claims of the children of military women for
injuries incurred in utero. Part III of this note will critique how the Ortiz
court applied the Feres Doctrine. Part IV of this note will discuss reasons
why the Feres Doctrine is unfair when claims are barred when the injury
to the fetus or an infant of an active duty service woman was sustained in
utero. Part IV will also recommend new changes to the Feres Doctrine
that the military, Congress, and the Supreme Court should take into
consideration.
I. THE BIRTH OF THE FERES DOCTRINE
A. Overview of the Federal Tort Claims Act
Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) of 1945, suits against
the Government were barred because the United States had sovereign
immunity.9 Consequently, under the FTCA, congress provided a limited
waiver of sovereign immunity for certain tort claims.'o The FTCA allows
suits against the United States for personal injury or death caused by a
government employee's negligence under circumstances in which a
private person would be liable under the law of the state in which the
negligent act or omission occurred." The administrative-exhaustion
requirement applicable to FTCA claims bars claimants from bringing suit
in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.12
In order to establish governmental liability under the FTCA § 2671, a
plaintiff must meet the private parallel liability test. Under this test, the
plaintiff must prove that the injury was caused by the negligence of the
government employee under circumstances where the United States, if it
were a private person or entity, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act occurred.' 3 Section
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
to 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012); Carter-El v. District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections,
893 F. Supp. 2d 243 (D.D.C. 2012).
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674; see also Estate of Sanders v. U.S., 736 F.3d 430 (5th
Cir. 2013).
12 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2012); Barnes v. U.S., 776 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2015).
13 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2012); Gallardo v. U.S., 752 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2014).
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2674 of the FTCA relieves the government of liability for punitive
damages. 14
B. Feres v. United States
The Feres Doctrine derived from three claims, which were against
the United States Government under the FTCA, combined and heard
before the Supreme Court. 5 Two of the cases were active military tort
claimants who were negligently treated by military medical personnel.16
The third claim was by a soldier killed in a fire in his barracks. 7
Following Feres, the courts grappled with the Feres Doctrine by
attempting to define its application and purpose.
In order to properly rule on the merits of the three consolidated
claims, the Supreme Court in Feres needed to thoroughly analyze the
FTCA. The Court began its dissection of the FTCA by noting that there
were very little tools of statutory interpretation, as committee notes and
floor debates are silent on the issue of whether active military can bring a
tort claim against the Government." The Court quickly carved out one
exception to the FTCA: tort claims not incidental to service.19 One
purpose of the FTCA that the Feres Court recognized is to "mitigate
unjust consequences of sovereign immunity" because tort claimants were
prevented from bringing a claim against the government prior to the
Act.20
The FTCA gives federal courts jurisdiction for plaintiffs to bring
claims against the United States for money damages, but this grant of
jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that the courts must allow all
claims to be brought. 2 ' For the purposes of determining whether the
courts should exercise their jurisdictional powers, the FTCA utilizes the
following parallel liability test: "The United States shall be liable . . . in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." 22
14 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
15 Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. But note, the Act does expressly state that recovery is not permitted during times
of war. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting). So, the question presented
before the Feres Court was whether the Act permitted claims for injuries incurred while
on active duty, but not during a time of war.
19 Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 141.
22 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
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Under this test, the FTCA is not creating a new cause of action, but
the "acceptance of liability under circumstances that would bring private
liability into existence." 23 The crux of the Feres Court's analysis is that it
failed to see a situation where an individual would have a claim against a
private individual in a similar situation.24 The Court continued to explain
how a situation could arise where private individuals would be liable in a
similar situation, but turned away from this theory because liability must
be present in all situations. 25 The Court gave some examples of where
there would and would not be liability if an analogous claim was brought
against a private individual. 26 One example the Court gave that does not
rise to the level of private liability is when an employee who is injured
on the job does not have a claim against the employer because the
employee's claim has been replaced by worker's compensation-an out
of court remedy.2 7 Therefore, parallel liability does not exist under an
employee/employer situation for injuries sustained on the job,
eliminating the argument that the service members should be allowed to
bring the claims because the Government is an "employer" of active duty
service members. 28 Thus, the Court determined that the claims in Feres
did not meet the parallel liability test.2 9
Furthermore, the Court noted that the Government's relationship to
military personnel, unlike private citizens, is "distinctively federal in
character."3 0 The Feres Court then concluded by emphatically denying
the ability for the three tort claimants to bring their law suits under the
FTCA because the relationship between military personnel and the
Government is not governed by private law but by Federal law.3 '
C. Rationalizing the Feres Doctrine
The next case in the series of landmark cases refining the Feres
Doctrine is United States v. Johnson.32 In Johnson, the plaintiff died in a
helicopter crash that resulted from the negligence of a civilian who was
employed by a government agency, the Federal Aviation
Administration.3 3 The Supreme Court declined to overrule the Feres
23 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 145.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Feres, 340 U.S. at 145.
30 Id. at 143.
31 Id. at 146.
32 Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
33 Id. at 682.
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Doctrine, rationalizing that the Feres Doctrine has never been about the
person responsible for causing the presumably negligent injuries. The
focus has always been on whether military personnel incurred an injury
that "arose out of [service] or [was] in the course of activity incident to
service." 3 4 Thus, the Court extended the Feres Doctrine and emphasized
that the Feres Doctrine bars all suits brought on behalf of service
members against the Government for all service-related injuries,
regardless of whether the injury incurred from a civilian or another
military personnel.35
The Court then clarified the Feres Doctrine by explaining the three
rationales for the Feres Doctrine.36 The first rationale is that the
relationship between military service members and the Government is
"distinctively federal in nature." 37 A military person on active duty is
required to perform a diverse set of orders some of which may pose a
significant risk of accident or injury.38 When an active duty service
member is injured "incident to service," the Government provides a
variety of federal statutory remedies, none of which include a lawsuit.39
By applying the provided federal remedy, it provides "simple, certain,
and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed
services. 4 0
Because "generous" statutory remedies are afforded to injured
military personnel for death or disability, the pre-determined method of
recovery is a second, independent rationale for the Feres Doctrine.41
Since the primary purpose of the FTCA was to provide a remedy to those
who are without a remedy, the purpose of the FTCA is disregarded if
service members are allowed to bring a lawsuit since the service
members are already being generously compensated by statutory
remedies that do not require litigation in court.4 2 Congressional intent
supports this rationale because Congress did not provide for an offsetting
of the statutory remedies and lawsuit under the FTCA; there is no
mention in the FTCA of interplay between these two types of remedies.4 3
Thus, the Court reasoned that the statutory remedies, such as the
Veterans' Benefit Act, give the upper limit of liability of the Government
34 Id. at 683-84, 687-89 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S at 159).
35 Id. at 683-84, 687-89.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 683-84, 687-88.
39 Id.
40 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 689 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S at 144).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 690.
43 Id.
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and are intended to be the sole remedy for service-related injuries.44
These statutory benefits for service-related injuries operate much like
workman's compensation.45
The third and final rationale for the Feres Doctrine is that courts
should not meddle with military affairs, because they could affect
military discipline and the effectiveness of the military in general.46
Under this rationale, the Court noted that allowing service members to
bring claims could not only affect the sensitive military hierarchy of
discipline, but could also undermine the "duty and loyalty to one's
service and one's country." 4 7
The Johnson court gave instructions for when an analysis into the
Feres Doctrine would be necessary.4 8 When a typical case exists, such as
an active duty service member suing the Government for negligent injury
caused by another active duty service member, the focus is on whether
those injuries were sustained "incident to service." 4 9 In the typical cases,
an analysis into the three rationales is not needed.o However, when the
atypical case does not exist, such as a non-military Government
employee or another civilian caused the injuries to an active duty service
member, an analysis into the three Feres rationales is required." The
Court also noted that none of the three rationales significantly depended
on whether the tortfeasor was civilian or military personnel.52
In Johnson, the court thoroughly analyzed the three rationales, but
hastily concluded its opinion without an adequate application53 of the
three rationales to the facts of the case. The Court simply stated that there
was no dispute that Johnson's injuries arose out of events incident to his
military service, that his wife was receiving statutory benefits after his
death, and that Johnson was acting pursuant to military orders.54
The dissent in Johnson, written by Justice Scalia and joined by
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens, harshly criticized
the Feres Doctrine and the unjust result the Doctrine brings to injured
military personnel." The Johnson dissent began by arguing that instead
44 id.
45 Id.
46 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 690.
47 Id. at 691.
48 Id. at 684.
49 Id.
5o Id. at 684.
51 Id.
52 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 689.
53 Considering that the bulk of the opinion is spent discussing the three rationales, the
application to these rationales is very limited. See generally Id.
54 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691.
5 Id. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of three rationales for the Feres Doctrine, there are actually four
rationales for the Feres Doctrine.5 6 The following are the four rationales
the dissent identified: (1) parallel private liability required under the
FTCA is absent; (2) Congress did not intend to have local tort govern the
distinctively federal relationship between active service members and the
Government; (3) Congress did not intend to make claims
available under the FTCA for service personnel who were already
receiving veteran's benefits for injuries sustained "incident to service"
and; (4) Congress did not intend to permit suits for service-
related injuries because those type of claims would interfere with the
military discipline. The dissent in Johnson reasoned that the last three
rationales are merely speculating Congress's intent and only the first
rationale is in fact supported by the plain text of the statute. Because of
the lack of support for all four of the rationales, the dissent emphatically
stated that no reason justified the result of the Feres Doctrine or the
failure to apply the plain text of the FTCA.
The first of the merely speculative rationales the Johnson dissent
recognized is Congress did not intend local tort law to govern a
distinctively federal relationship because of the unfairness of the active
military service member in making a recovery based on where the injury
was sustained, something outside of the service member's control.59
However, the dissent criticized this as a weak rationale based on poor
policy and principal in order support the Feres Doctrine. The dissent
even went as far as calling this justification "absurd," stating that non-
uniform recovery is better than no recovery at all.6 0 The dissent also
noted that uniform recovery is illusory because recovery in local tort law
is permitted to service members for injuries not related to service and to
* * *61
civilians for injuries sustained from military negligence.
Second, the rationale that Congress intended to make the Veterans'
Benefit Act the sole remedy is no longer controlling law.62 Thus, the
dissent rejected the idea that the FTCA intended the Veterans' Benefit
Act to be the sole means of recovery and the Government's upper limit
of accepting liability.63 The dissent gave two examples, both before and
after Feres was decided, where the Supreme Court permitted recovery
under the Veterans' Benefit Act and allowed claims to be brought under
56 Id at 694.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 695.
60 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 696 (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66-69 (1955)).
62 Id. at 697 (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985)).
63 Id.
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the FTCA.64 Both of these cases, the dissent pointed out, have never been
"expressly disapproved," and both cases hold that nothing in either the
FTCA or the Veterans' Benefit Act provide for exclusiveness of one
remedy over the other.65 The dissent ended its criticism for this rationale
by stating "'the presence of an alternative compensation system [neither]
explains [n]or justifies the Feres Doctrine; it only makes the effect of the
doctrine more palatable."' 66
Third, the dissent criticized the rationale that allowing service
members to bring suit under the FTCA has any impact on effecting
military discipline.67 The reality is, no matter how much courts try to
avoid it, courts need to evaluate military discipline in the form of
adjudicating cases, especially when there is a civilian involved. 68
However, the dissent noted that the FTCA does give specific examples of
when courts should not question military commands: claims based on
combat decisions, claims based on performance of discretionary
functions, claims arising in foreign countries, intentional torts, and
claims based upon the execution of a statute or regulation.6 9 Then, the
dissent presented the ground-breaking idea that perhaps the reason why
Congress did not expressly bar suits from being brought by service
members is because "Congress thought that barring recovery by service
members might adversely affect military discipline."7 0 Justice Scalia
concluded the opinion with a caution not to extend Feres any further than
it already has been extended.7
D. Drawing the Line - Does Feres Apply to All Victims?
The Supreme Court in United States v. Brown, for the first time since
Feres was decided, recognized an exception to the Feres Doctrine.72
Although the exception to the Feres Doctrine in Brown was decided in
64 The two examples were Brown and Brooks. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 697-98 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (U.S. 1949); see also U.S. v.
Brown, 348 U.S. at 111.
65 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 697-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53;
US. v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 111.
66 Id. at 698 (quoting Hunt v. United States, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 326 (1980)).
67 Id. at 699.
68 Id. at 700 (giving the example that if the helicopter had been crashed into a house,
the homeowners would have a claim with the Government, and thus, the courts would
have questioned military decision making).
69 Id. at 699-700 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
7o Id. at 700 (emphasis not added).
71 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 703.
72 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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dicta because Brown's ruling was based on Brooks v. United States,73 the
argument and foundation built for the exception is not without merit.74
In Brown, the court allowed a military veteran who was seeking
recovery from a negligent injury caused by military hospital staff while
receiving treatment at a veteran's hospital. 5  The plaintiff was a
civilian-even though he was being treated for injuries sustained while
he was considered on active duty.76 The Court distinguished between
claims that "arose out of [service] or [was] in the course of activity
incident to service" (and subsequently would be barred under the Feres
Doctrine) and claims that did not arise out of service or were not in the
course of military duty.
The Supreme Court in Brown analyzed that the FTCA was created so
the Government could waive sovereign immunity from recognized
causes of action, but not to open up the Government to new and novel
liability.7 ' However, the Court recognized that the FTCA does not
preclude claims that might be recognized under state law by a private
party.79 The Court gave two examples of situations in which liability is
well-established: the responsibility of hospitals to their patients and the
liability of car owners.so Thus, the Court ruled that the veteran could
sustain his claim under the FTCA because the damage did not arise out
of or in the course of his military service, but the negligence occurred
after his military service, while he was a veteran.8
II. GROWING PAINS: APPLYING THE FERESDOCTRINE TO THIRD
PARTIES
Following Feres, numerous cases have decided whether third party
claimants are barred from bringing claims under the Feres Doctrine.
Even though the Feres Doctrine is a well-established doctrine, courts are
nonetheless still grappling with how to handle third party claimants,
specifically, when a service member's child suffers an injury in the
73 In Brooks, it was determined that military personnel on leave, and not on active
duty, could recover under the FTCA. 337 U.S. 49, 54 (U.S. 1949). Feres did not overturn
Brooks, but merely distinguished it, so Brooks is still controlling law. Brown, 348 U.S. at
112. This exception ruled in dicta was even recognized by Justice Scalia in the dissent of
Johnson.
74 See generally U.S. v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110.
SId. at 112.
76 Id.
7 Id.
78 Id. at 112-13.
79 Id. at 113.
80 U.S. v. Brown, 348 U.S at 113.
81 Id. at 110.
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mother's womb. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
issue as to whether recovery under the FTCA is allowed under Feres
when the injury was sustained in utero. The Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of whether claims by a civilian should be allowed
under the FTCA for injuries sustained by active military personnel and
permitted civilians to bring these type of claims. However, the Supreme
Court has dismissed indemnification suits by third parties who injured an
active service member. 82
A. The Supreme Court - Third Party Claimants
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether third parties
had a claim under the FTCA in Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation v.
United States.83 Captain John Donham suffered permanent injuries when
the ejection seat to his aircraft malfunctioned.8 4 Even though Donham
was compensated under statutory remedies, Donham brought a claim
against the United States and Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation, the
manufacturers of the aircraft."5 Stencel Aero then cross-claimed against
the United States for indemnity and The United States moved to dismiss
both of the claims because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Feres Doctrine.86
The Stencel Aero Court then analyzed the three rationales for the
Feres Doctrine.8 7 First, the Court easily came to the conclusion that the
relationship between the suppliers and the Government, like the
relationship between an active duty service member and the Government,
is distinctively federal in character." The Court did not want to depart
from prior case law and create a cause of action based on local law for
service-related injuries or death due to negligence.8 As to the second
factor, the Court had some difficulty applying this rationale because it
seemed unfair to allow Donham to recover from Stencel Aero, while
Stencel Aero would not be afforded relief from the Government.90 Yet,
the Government was bound by the predetermined statutory maximum
amount of acceptance of liability for Donham's injuries. 9' But in the end,
the Court determined that the indemnification claim was an attempt by
82 Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 667.
85 Id. at 668.
86 Id. at 668-69.
87 See generally Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
88 Id. at 672.
89 Id. at 671.
90 Id. at 672.
91 Id.
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Donham that merely circumvented the cap the Government had
92thr
implemented for allowable recovery. For the third factor, the Court
reasoned that when a case involves an injury sustained by a soldier on
duty, regardless of whether the tortfeasor was the Government or a third
party, the trial would require an inquiry that would involve "second-
guessing military orders." 93 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the third-
party suit to be brought because of the three rationales of the Feres
Doctrine.94
The dissent in Stencel Aero disagreed with extending the Feres
Doctrine, reasoning that the extension was unjustified and was no
different than a corporation suing the Government under other permitted
provisions of the FTCA.9 5 The dissent pointed out that the Veterans'
Benefit Act does not explicitly include a provision on whether the
Veterans' Benefit Act is meant to be the exclusive remedy and upper
limit of liability for the Government. 9 6 Yet, the private liability
equivalent, worker's compensation, which the statutes due expressly
include a provision that worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy,
does not affect the right of third party indemnity suits, which courts have
allowed. 97
Additionally, the dissent argued that concerns of military personnel
bringing lawsuits against their superiors does not arise when a non-
military third party is the one bringing the claim. 98 Had the situation been
that the airplane seat ejected and landed on the rooftop of somebody's
house, the homeowner, unlike an active duty service member,
undoubtedly would have a cause of action against the Government under
the FTCA.99 The trial in that scenario might even include testimony from
military personnel about their orders given, decision, and subsequent
actions, but neither the Feres Doctrine nor the FTCA would bar such
suit.' 0 0 Thus, the dissent concluded that the reasoning in Stencel Aero is
flawed when the analysis is applied to other similar fact pattems. o
92 Id. at 673.
93 Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 673.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 675.
97 See Id. at 675-76.
98 Id. at 676.
99 Id.
100 Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 676-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 677.
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B. The Supreme Court-Civilian Claimants
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, the plaintiffs brought a claim
under the FTCA against the Govermment for damages sustained due to
the alleged negligence of the United States Coast Guard in operating a
lighthouse.102 The Government argued that the FTCA provides for
recourse only if private liability would be imposed in the same
circumstances.' 03 Furthermore, the Government claimed that there cannot
be any liability based on the negligent performance of an activity in of
itself, in other words, the "end objective" of the activity.1 04 The Court
rejected this argument because all activities conducted by the
Government could be characterized as "uniquely govermmental," and
thus liability on the Government would never be imposed on the basis
that there is not a parallel private activity.'0 o The Court also reasoned that
such minor details were not intended for the courts to interpret and that
FTCA drafters were careful in ensuring substantive and procedural
safeguards.1 06 Once the Government decided to operate the lighthouse,
the Government owed a duty of due care to ensure the lighthouse
remained operational, and was consequently liable for any damages for
failing to maintain the lighthouse. 0 7 The intentions of the FTCA are
clear: once the Government undergoes an activity, a duty of due care is
owed to ensure that activity is not negligently conducted, and the
Government is liable for any damages.'0o
C. The Circuit Split
Five circuits have addressed whether liability should be imposed on
the Government under the FTCA for damages sustained in utero to the
child of an active military woman. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held
that the Feres Doctrine bars recovery.' 09 However, the Sixth Circuit has
since held that the Feres Doctrine may not bar recovery in certain
circumstances.o"0 The Eleventh, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have all held
102 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 61-62 (1955).
103 Id. at 64.
104 Id. at 66.
105 Id. at 67.
06 Id. at 61.
107 Id. at 69.
108 Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
109 See Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Irvin v.
United States, 845 F.2d 126, 127 (6th Cir. 1988).
110 Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2006).
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that the Feres Doctrine does not bar recovery."' The early cases applied
the Feres Doctrine and barred claims of children of military women for
injuries that occurred in utero.112 However, as the circuits continued to
evaluate the issue, there was a shift from barring the claims to allowing
the claims because the Feres rationales are not present during these types
of claims. Furthermore, when an injury occurs in the womb, there is an
express denial in the later cases of the application of the genesis test,
which forbids claims deriving from a military mother's injuries. In the
later circuit cases, there is a move in the right direction to cure the
injustice of the Feres Doctrine as it relates to claims brought by children
for injuries sustained in utero.
1. The Circuit Split: The Feres Doctrine Bars Recovery For
Infants-Or Does It?
In Scales v. United States, the Fifth Circuit barred an infant," 3
through his mother, from bringing a claim under the FTCA because of
the Feres Doctrine.114 The Scales court briefly highlighted the first of the
two rationales for the Feres Doctrine, the distinctively federal
relationship and the special remedy for service personnel under the
Veterans' Benefit Act." 5 However, the court placed an emphasis on what
the court thought was the most important rationale: the need to preserve
military discipline." 6
The court relied on the reasoning in Stencel Aero, interpreting
Stencel Aero as barring claims to non-military personnel if the claim
would involve an inquiry into military affairs.' '1 Additionally, the court
reasoned that because Feres directly discussed two medical malpractice
claims brought by non-military personnel, the Feres Court intended to
bar all claims involving medical malpractice that would require
questioning military discipline." The court concluded that allowing the
child's claim would hypothetically have the same result as if his mother
111 Del Rio v. United States, 833 F.2d 282, 284 (11th Cir. 1987); Mossow v. United
States, 987 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1993); Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223, 225
(4th Cir. 1992).
112 See Scales, 685 F.2d 970; see also Irvin, 845 F.2d 126.
113 The infant was injured as a result of negligent medical treatment in the womb of his
active duty military mother. The military mother received a rubella vaccine while she was
pregnant, which caused her infant to be born with congenital rubella syndrome.
114 Scales, 685 F.2d at 971.
115 Id. at 972
116 Id.
11 Id.
118 Id.
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brought the suit for personal injuries she sustained during delivery: the
courts questioning military decisions." 9 Thus, the child was not allowed
to bring the claim, even though he was never an active duty service
member at any point in his life and maintained an independent cause of
action. 2 0
In the Sixth Circuit case Irvin v. United States, a former service
member mother and her husband brought a suit against the Government
for failing to give adequate prenatal care, which resulted in the death of
their child.12' The court examined the three Feres rationales, stating that
it is obvious that any suit of this type would involve "second guessing"
military affairs, and thus, effectively has the same result as if any active
duty service member brought the suit for personal injuries.1 22 The court,
relying on Stencel Aero, adopted the genesis test, which forbids any
claims that derive from an active military personnel's injury, expanding
the Feres Doctrine. Under the expansive approach of genesis test, not
only is an indirect "derivative claim" of an active service member's
injury prevented, such as a loss of companionship claim, but the test also
prevents claims that are "derivative injury" from of an active service
member's injury.1 23
A few years later in Brown v. United States, although the Sixth
Circuit did not expressly overrule Irvin, the court did limit its harsh
reasoning and provided factual scenarios where the Feres Doctrine did
not apply, even when the injury occurred in utero.124 The court permitted
recovery in Brown because no injury was sustained by the military
mother and injuries were sustained only by the infant.1 25 The court
rejected the Fifth Circuit's claim that a fetus could never maintain an
independent cause of action.1 2 6 The court also reasoned that a negligence
claim for medical malpractice during prenatal care or during labor and
delivery is a claim the courts can entertain, and do so on a routine basis,
without any judicial intervention in "sensitive military affairs." 27
119 Id. at 974.
120 Scales, 685 F.2d at 973.
121 Irvin, 845 F.2d at 127.
122 Id. at 129.
123 Id. at 130.
124 Brown v. U.S., 462 F.3d at 615-16.
125 Id. at 615-16.
126 Id. at 614 (quoting Scales, 685 F.2d at 973).
127 Id. at 615.
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2. The Circuit Split: The Feres Doctrine Allows Recovery For
Infants
The Eleventh Circuit in Del Rio v. United States, a military mother
was forbidden from bringing an action against the United States under
the FTCA for negligent prenatal care administered by active duty
military, resulting in personal injuries and the wrongful death of her
son.1 28 The court ruled that the mother could not bring the action for the
damages for her personal injuries because of the Feres Doctrine.12 9
However, the court ruled that the action for damages sustained by the
child withstands the application of the Feres Doctrine because that claim
will not "circumvent the purposes of the FTCA."1 30 The court reasoned
that the three rationales for the Feres Doctrine "clearly are not present in
a suit by the child of a service person for the negligence of military
medical staff."131 First, the "distinctive federal" relationship between a
child and the Government is not the same as a soldier who is on active
duty.1 3 2 Second, there are not any statutory benefits available to the
children.1 33 And third, while adjudicating this claim does require a
possible inquiry into military discipline, it does not reduce the
effectiveness of the military service, nor will the inquiry "require the
court to second-guess a decision by military personnel unique to the
accomplishment of a military mission."1 3 4
The Fourth Circuit in Romero v. United States, denied application of
the genesis test as it related to prenatal or labor and delivery medical
care.1 35 The court reasoned that the genesis test was meant for injuries to
civilians that derived from a service-related injury, but was not meant to
be used to determine whether the injury to a civilian occurred during
active duty service.1 36 The court explained that a classic example of the
proper application of the genesis test is birth defects from a service
member's exposure to radiation, which looks at a past injury that caused
a future injury.137 However, the court reasoned that the genesis test was
not meant to bar claims of an infant for acts of military negligence when
treatment directed towards both the fetus and the active duty service
woman may overlap, which sometimes may involve simultaneous
128 Del Rio, 833 F.2d at 284 (11th Cir. 1987).
129 Id. at 287.
130 id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 id.
134 Del Rio, 833 F.2d at 287.
135 Romero, 954 F.2d at 226.
136 id.
137 id.
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injuries to the mother and fetus or infant.' 38 The court further explained
that in order to properly administer care to an unborn child and ensure
the health of a civilian, sometimes it will involve the mother's body, but
that does not mean the care is directed towards the active duty mother. 3 9
The Romero court also recognized that the Government owes an
affirmative duty of care directly to the civilian child.1 4 0
The Eighth Circuit in Mossow by Mossow v. United States adopted
almost verbatim the reasoning in Romero.'141 In Mossow, the plaintiff
suffered from cerebral palsy as a result of injuries caused by military
negligence during the time of his birth.1 42 The court emphasized that
claims are not barred by Feres when the claimant is a civilian or civilian
dependent who has sustained a direct injury from military personnel. 14
The court rejected the application of the genesis test because the plaintiff
sustained his own individual injuries that were not derivative of a service
woman's injuries; thus, the plaintiff maintained his own independent
cause of action as a civilian.1 44 Furthermore, the court ruled that the
claim would not disrupt military discipline because the claim would not
involve questioning military orders given to military personnel or
involve actions taken to complete a military mission. 4 1
III. THE FLAWED REASONING OF THE ORTIZ COURT
In the 10th Circuit Case, Ortiz v. United States ex rel. Evans Army
Community Hospital, 1.0., the child of Captain Ortiz, sustained injuries
in the womb as a result of negligent treatment during labor and delivery
at a military hospital.1 4 6 The Ortiz court ruled that I.O.'s injuries were
"incident to service" because the injuries sustained by 1.0. occurred
while she was in the womb of Captain Ortiz, an active duty service
member.1 4 7 The court also applied the genesis test, as adopted in Irvin:
but for Captain Ortiz's injuries, 1.0. would not have been injured.1 48
Furthermore, the court ruled that I.O.'s injuries derived from Captain
Ortiz's injuries, comparing how I.O.'s claim was similar to third party
138 id
139 id.
140 id.141
141 Mossow, 987 F.2d at 1369.
142 Id. at 1367.
143 Id. at 1368.
144 Id. at 1369-70.
145 Id. at 1370.
146 Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 818-19.
147 Id. at 822.
148 Id. at 827 (citing Irvin, 845 F.2d).
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loss of consortium claims.1 4 9 Because it was determined that I.O.'s
injuries derived from Captain Ortiz, under the genesis test, I.O.'s claims
were barred since they were considered incident to the service of Captain
Ortiz. 1o
Even though the Ortiz court thought they were adhering to precedent,
the Ortiz court wrongly decided this case. The court chose an incorrect
starting point for the application of the injury under the genesis test. 151
1.0. sustained independent injuries that did not derive from Captain Ortiz
and therefore I.O.'s injuries should not have been considered a derivate
injury of her mother's under the genesis test.1 5 2 By applying the genesis
test, the court disregarded the original intent of the Feres Doctrine.
Moreover, the court could have distinguished from precedent without the
risk of not following precedent. The court tried to squeeze their ruling
into doctrine intended to prevent claims that would otherwise not be
entertained by a private citizen, and prevented a claim that had Captain
Ortiz been treated by a private citizen, 1.0. could have sought recovery.
Merely because Captain Ortiz was on active duty should not have
prevented the claims brought by 1.0. for injuries incurred in utero.
The court incorrectly applied the genesis test because the claim was
not a derivative claim based on the mother's injuries; it was an
independent cause of action. Surely if the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act recognizes a child in utero as an independent person, so too should
the Ortiz court have when it applied the Feres Doctrine.153 The focus of
the Ortiz court should not have been whether the injury first occurred to
the mother, and thus whether I.O.'s injuries were "derivative" on the
mother's right to bring a claim, instead the focus should have been on
1.0. who is an independent, non-military person.
Furthermore, this is not a situation where an injury sustained by an
active duty service member in the past caused a future injury to a fetus,
but this is a situation where injuries occurred simultaneously to both the
fetus and the mother. Under the expansive approach of the Fourth
Circuit, which only uses the genesis test for injuries to civilians that were
derived from a service related injury, most actions taken during labor and
delivery could be construed to ensure the health of a civilian and
therefore are not a service related injury. Merely because the treatment of
care towards Captain Ortiz's and I.O.'s well-being might have
overlapped should overshadow the fact that 1.0. is a civilian who was
149 Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 825.
150 Id. at 831.
151 Id. at 831-32.
152 Id.
153 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2012) (commonly referred to as the "Unborn Victims of Violence
Act of 2004").
2015-16] 195
196 U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV
injured because of military negligence. The analysis should have begun
with the fetus, an independent person, not with the mother, even though
those actions involve the body of an active duty service woman, and
possible simultaneous injuries.
Notwithstanding the fact that 1.0. is an independent person with an
independent cause of action under the FTCA, the Ortiz court should have
relied on the Sixth Circuit in Brown v. United States and at least
permitted the claim for failing to properly monitor I.O.'s heart monitor, a
benefit solely to the fetus. The inadequate monitoring did not affect
Captain Ortiz's health in anyway just like failing to adequately give
prenatal treatment did not affect the mother's health in Brown.15 4
The court in Ortiz wrongly veered from the original intent of the
Feres Doctrine when the court prevented 1.0. from bringing a claim
against the Government for the negligence of the doctors during labor
and delivery. This was not a service-related injury arising out of Captain
Ortiz's services, but an event that occurred independent of Captain
Ortiz's service. Furthermore, 1.0. was a private citizen, a mere infant, not
a service member who had contracted to serve in the military. 1.0. did
not voluntarily forfeit her claims by enlisting in the military, contrary to
military personnel. In Indian Towing, the plaintiffs were allowed to
recover because they were injured as a result of the Coast Guard's
negligence.' 1.0. deserved recovery as much as the plaintiffs did in
Indian Towing, since she too sustained injuries from military negligence.
Moreover, had Captain Ortiz gone to a private hospital, 1.0.
would not have any of the obstacles to overcome in bringing the
negligence claim. Since 1.0. would have had a cause of action if Captain
Ortiz gave birth in a private hospital, the parallel private liability test, one
of the requirements under the FTCA, is met in Ortiz.15 6 As the Supreme
Court in Brown so eloquently pointed out, medical malpractice is indeed
a well-established liability of a breach of duty that hospitals owe to their
patients. 7 That duty was breached to 1.0., a private citizen, and 1.0.
deserved adequate compensation for the injuries that occurred from
negligent treatment. If the purpose of the FTCA was to truly bar claims,
which otherwise would not have been able to be brought against the
government simply because the government is not a "private citizen,"
then that purpose has not been upheld by the Ortiz court. 58
The Ortiz court stated that it was not at liberty to go against the
Supreme Court. But this case could have a different outcome and still
154 Brown v. U.S., 462 F.3d at 615.
155 Indian Towing, 350 U.S. 61.
156 Id.
157 U.S. v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113.
15s See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2012).
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have followed Supreme Court precedent by merely declining to extend
the Supreme Court's ruling or by distinguishing the Supreme Court's
ruling in Feres.15 9 The Oritz court should have declined to extend Feres
any further, as the dissent in Johnson cautioned.1 60 The purpose of the
FTCA was to extend a remedy to those who had been without a remedy,
rather than to make additional provision for those already provided for
under the statute.161 When the Ortiz court barred 1.0. from bringing her
claim, the court deviated from the purpose of the FTCA because 1.0.
would be left without a remedy since there are not any statutory
provisions that would provide for her. In fact, the Ortiz court could have
ruled based off of Brown 's rationale that once the government undertakes
an operation, it owes a duty of care. 162 Under that rationale, the Ortiz
court would not have been straying away from any Supreme Court
decision but would have been wholly in line with Supreme Court
precedent. Instead, the Ortiz court wrongfully and regretfully 63 chose to
expand the Feres Doctrine and took the doctrine farther than Supreme
Court ever intended for the doctrine to go because the purpose of the
doctrine was not to bar citizen's claims, but only active duty service
member's claims.
Thus, because 1.0. is an independent person with an independent
cause of action, like the plaintiffs in Johnson or Indian Towing, 1.0.
should be allowed to bring her claim under the FTCA, notwithstanding
the Feres Doctrine. Military personnel did not cause injuries to an active
duty service member; however, military personal did cause injuries to
1.0., a private citizen. Like the factual scenario described in the dissent
of Johnson, where a homeowner would have been able to recover from
military negligence, so should I.O.'s claim been expressly permitted
under the FTCA because 1.0. is a private citizen.164 Mere proximity in
relationship to military personnel should not prevent non-military
claimants from recovery for the military's negligence.
In Brown, the veteran sustained injuries from the hospital's staff
negligent treatment for an injury that occurred while he was on active
duty. The beginning of Brown's original injury occurred while he was on
159 Stare decisis binds prior decisions only if the legal point on which the case was
decided on is the same or substantially the same in both cases. See e.g. District of
Columbia v. Gould, 852 A.2d 50 (D.C. 2004); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So.
2d 871 (Fla. 2007).
160 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 703.
161 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
162 Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
163 When the court ruled they were going to apply the Feres Doctrine, the court said,
"[w]e wish, frankly, that were not the case." Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 832.
164 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700.
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active duty, but the negligence occurred during follow up treatment when
he was no longer active military. In Ortiz the beginning of the injury
incurred while Captain Ortiz was on active duty, but it ended with an
injury to a private citizen. 1.0. never even served in the military, her
mother was on active duty, whereas a retired veteran was active duty at
one time. If the veteran in Brown could recover for injuries as a result of
negligence by military personnel during his status as a veteran, relief
should have been afforded to 1.0., who never had status as a service
member. In other words, if a military veteran can recover for damages,
so should an unborn child, who has a status that is far more removed than
a veteran.
Neither was the Ortiz court bound by Stencel Aero because I.O.'s
case is a factually distinctive scenario. 1.0. is not trying to circumvent
the statutory remedies by bringing an indemnification claim but 1.0. has
an independent cause of action and is not provided statutory remedies. In
Stencel Aero, the Supreme Court ruled that Stencel Aero Incorporation's
indemnification claims against the government were barred under the
Feres Doctrine because the claim would have the same effect as if a
service member brought the claim, thus undermining the purpose of the
Feres Doctrine.165  1.0. is not seeking recovery because of injuries
sustained during active duty service but is seeking recovery because of
an injury sustained from an active duty service member-a one-word
difference that should have permitted 1.0. to seek relief from the
Government under the FTCA.
The Ortiz Court claimed that it should follow Stencel Aero because
other Circuit Courts have applied Stencel Aero to third party claims even
when they were not indemnity claims.1 66 But the Ortiz court was not
bound by the Circuit Courts' decision to expand Stencel Aero. The court
should have rejected the Sixth Circuits expansion of Stencel Aero
because the reasoning of Stencel Aero was not to prevent all derivative
injuries, but derivative claims that attempted to circumvent the upper-
level amount of acceptance of liability of the Government.167 By this
reasoning, the homeowner potential plaintiff in Stencel Aero would not
have received any recovery because it derived from the chain of events
of the Government's negligence. Additionally, unlike the plaintiff in
Stencel Aero, 1.0. is not attempting to circumvent the upper-level
liability of the Government under the Veterans' Benefit Act.1 68 In fact,
165 Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 673.
166 Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 824.
167 Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 673.
168 Id.
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there is no other recovery available to 1.0. unless this claim is allowed to
be brought before the court.
Despite the court's insistence that allowing the claim to be brought
by 1.0. will disrupt the "military discipline," the Ortiz court did not offer
a rationale on precisely how military discipline will be disrupted any
more intrusively than other civilian claims that are brought because of
military negligence under the FTCA. 1.0. is a child who was injured by
military negligence while in a military hospital, not a service member
who could possibly disrupt military discipline. Furthermore, Captain
Ortiz was not acting pursuant to military orders like the plaintiff in
Johnson. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have held that
claims brought for military negligence during prenatal care or labor and
delivery require little, if any, inquiry into either possible "sensitive
military affairs," or "military mission[s]."1 6 9 Thus, the third rationale, not
wanting to inquire about military orders, is not present in this case.
IV. SECOND CHANCES: RECONSIDERING THE FERES DOCTRINE
A. An Uneven and Unfair Application of the Feres Doctrine
The Feres Doctrine creates unequitable results when it prevents
civilian children of military personnel from recovering for an injury that
occurred while receiving treatment in a military hospital. For one, the
military benefit insurance will generally only provide coverage for care
received in a military hospital.1 70 Thus, a military service woman is
essentially required to deliver her child in a military hospital, and
subsequently is barred from bringing a potential negligence suit in civil
court. It creates a double edged sword with no recourse for injuries
sustained to a third party civilian, unlike active military personnel who at
least have some remedies available under the Veterans' Benefit Act.
Additionally, the Feres Doctrine was meant to provide even
application of recovery and to "mitigate unjust consequences of
sovereign immunity." 17 However, if the facts are changed slightly to a
civilian wife of a military service man gives birth in the military hospital,
and the child is injured because of negligence, the genesis test is
eliminated because the mother is not in the active military. Under this
scenario, presumably since the FTCA does not prevent recovery by
military dependents, recovery under the Act would be permitted. Even
169 Scales, 685 F.2d at 974; Del Rio, 833 F.2d at 287.
170 The TRICARE Prime Program, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/benefits
/tricare/prime/tricare-prime-overview.html (last visited 1/25/2016).
1t Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
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though the FTCA is a gender-neutral law on its face, the unfairness of the
application of the Feres Doctrine and the unjust consequences of
sovereign immunity are demonstrated above when the active duty
military service member is not the mother but is switched to a father
whose non-military wife is giving birth. Not only is the Feres Doctrine
unfair but it has the effect of discriminating towards pregnant women in
the military because there is no recovery to potential damages of their
non-military child who sustained injuries in utero. Thus, women in the
military are being unfairly discriminated against and the Feres Doctrine
is not providing an even application of recovery.
The Feres Doctrine should not bar claims brought by children of an
active duty military woman merely because the child is in the womb.
Under the Seventh Amendment,172 a child has a constitutional right to
equal access to the courts.1 73 Under this rationale, there not only is an
exception the Feres Doctrine but also an additional round-about way of
avoiding the Feres Doctrine.
To hold otherwise is a violation under the Equal Protection Clause.1 74
In Romer v. Evans, even though homosexuals were not members of a
protected class, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for the state
to make any laws that prohibited any legislative, judicial, or executive
action designed to protect homosexuals.17 The Court reasoned that "a
law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a
denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."1 7 6
Similarly, even though the Feres Doctrine is a gender-neutral law, the
doctrine is preventing children of military women from bringing their
claims in Court and leaving these children without any aid from the
government. Although the Feres Doctrine is not expressly singling out
children of military women, the Feres Doctrine as it stands today has the
effect of singling out children of military women from bringing claims
under the FTCA.
172 U.S. Const. amend. VII.
173 Laurie Higginbotham & Jamal Alsaffar, Fighting for Military Mothers' Newborns
When A Servicewoman Receives Negligent Prenatal Care, Can Her Civilian Child Be
Compensated for Birth Injuries? The Federal Circuits Disagree, but Lawyers Can Glean
Strategies from the Courts that Allow These Claims, Trial, December 2004, at 44, 46.
This argument has not been presented to the court in any circuit cases.
174 Under the doctrine of Reverse Incorporation, the Firth Amendment Due Process
Clause is read to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
175 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
176 Id. at 633.
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B. Three Rationales for Feres Are Not Present When Dealing
with Third-Parties Civilians
There are three main rationales for the Feres Doctrine. The first is
that the relationship between members of the armed forces and the
Government is distinctively federal in nature. When a civilian is the
recipient of negligent misconduct by a military member, the very
premise of the first rationale fails because there is no longer the
distinctive federal relationship that needs to be protected. There is no
longer a bilateral contract where the military personnel consented to
being in the military and under the Government's control. Instead, the
civilian is at the mercy of the military medical doctors to administer
proper care. However, once the Government decided to start accepting
civilians in its hospital, like the operation of the lighthouse in Indian
Towing, the Government owes a duty of due care to the civilian
patient. 17
Second, there is no recourse given to military dependents under the
Veterans' Benefit Act except for a widow receiving death benefits. There
are no statutory provisions providing recourse for a military dependents
being treated by military personnel. Until statutory provisions exist that
provide remedies for children of military personal, local tort law will
have to suffice to govern the claims brought under the FTCA.
Third, the Court's reasoning about upsetting military discipline is
flawed. Even if this reasoning was sound, this policy should not
withstand the injustice it brings to children who sustained injuries before
they were even born because of military negligence. Curiously, neither
Stencel Aero nor Johnson, two cases in which the Court emphasized the
need to protect military discipline, required an inquiry into military
affairs.17 Perhaps Justice Scalia was correct when he suggested that the
Court's refusal to question military orders is doing more harm than
good.1 79 Because of the concern to protect citizens, maybe the courts do
need to inquire into military affairs to adequately adjudicate claims in
negligence. When a civilian is involved in receiving medical care, there
is not a chain of military command present. As Major Brou pointed out,
this rationale is not present when military personnel are receiving
medical treatment.s0 In fact, the chain of command could be reversed if
a lower-command military service member is treating a higher-command
177 See Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 61.
17s See generally Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. 666 (1977); see also Johnson, 481 U.S. 681
(1987).
179 See Bruce D. Beach, The Death of Wilkes v. Dinsman: 'Special Factors Counseling
Hesitation'in Abandoning A Common Law Doctrine, 41 Baylor L. Rev. 179, 201 (1989).
1so Brou, supra note 8, at 56.
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military service member.'' Furthermore, this case is unlike Johnson,
where the service member died in a helicopter crash while carrying out a
military mission. During labor and delivery, a service woman is not
carrying out an activity in furtherance of a military mission.
C. Mitigating the Pain: Solutions to the Feres Doctrine
Below are a few novel solutions that either Congress could enact as
law, the armed services could implement a policy, or the court could rule
in order to bring justice to unborn children of military women who suffer
an injury while the mother is on active duty.
1. Congressional Action
Congress should implement laws to prevent the injustice that the
Feres Doctrine has created towards unborn children of military women.
It has been proposed before that the Military Veteran Benefits Act create
a program for the benefit of military infants and children. The creation of
a new program would create many logistical issues, such as what is types
of injuries are covered and the extent of coverage. Another issue with
this program is that there may not be adequate funding to properly
provide coverage, and again, the issue of adequate compensation
resurfaces.
If the last and only legitimate concern about the Feres Doctrine is
upsetting military discipline, perhaps Congress should consider creating
an Article 1 Court, where the claims are either adjudicated in civil court
or Judge Advocate General (JAG). This would require the cooperation of
the military to change their own policies. If the claims are not
adjudicated in JAG, the civil courts cannot issue final orders, only
recommendations and findings of facts, but the JAG court would issue
the final order. 8 2 This system would operate much like the bankruptcy
courts operate when hearing a Sterns claim: the bankruptcy courts issue
recommendations and findings of fact and the district courts issue the
final orders.'8 3 This new system would strike balance between protecting
the lives of the infants of military women yet still preserving the need to
protect the military discipline. This system for adjudicating claims would
only apply when a civilian's tortfeasor was military personnel. Under
this system, the original intent of the of the Feres Doctrine is still upheld,
181 Brou, supra note 8, at 56.
182 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (holding that the Bankruptcy court
lacked authority under Article III to enter final judgment on state-law counterclaim but
could issue proposed findings of fact).
183 id
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but yet the Seventh Amendment' 8 4 concerns are eliminated. This is not a
catch-all solution, and many questions would still be left unanswered.
2. Military Policy
One solution would be to give the mothers an option to take
additional military leave allotted specifically for being treated for
prenatal care at a military hospital. Of course, this would be burdensome
because of the procedures required for taking leave. Unless, the military
implemented a policy that service women are automatically on pre-
approved leave during prenatal visits or during labor and delivery at
military hospitals. Thus, the prenatal care or labor and delivery
procedures would undoubtedly not be "incident to service" because the
mother is now on leave and thus not on active duty.
3. Court Rulings
There is, however, a much simpler solution: creating an exception to
the Feres Doctrine. In light of the injustice the Feres Doctrine creates, it
is time for the Supreme Court to stop expanding the Feres Doctrine and
start limiting the application of it. The first of these limitations could be
that the Feres Doctrine does not apply to injuries incurred to active
military service members' infants while in the womb because of medical
malpractice of another service member. This would eliminate the
convoluted genesis test. The courts would no longer have to determine if
the injury occurred to an unborn infant and if it was "derivative" of an
injury "incident to military service." It eliminates splitting hairs to
determine whether the medical care was given for the primary benefit of
the mother or the unborn child-a test that will often result in
inconsistent or overlapping results.
This would also eliminate any concerns about over-diminishing the
Feres Doctrine because this exception would not apply to injuries
sustained due to medical malpractice to military personnel. This
exception is not liberally applied to all third party injuries, so any
concerns about third party suits being brought for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, loss of companionship, and loss of consortium are
also eliminated. This exception would not circumvent the current FTCA,
and would continue to exempt any claims during times of war.
The important distinction to this exception is that there must have
been an act or a failure to act by military personnel during the course of
medical treatment to a fetus or infant of an active duty service woman.
This exception fits squarely with the original intent of the Feres Doctrine
184 U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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because it meets the parallel liability test since it does not create new
liability for the Government under the FTCA and an infant would be able
to recover under private action.
Although it has been suggested' 85 that an exception should be
applied to all medical malpractice cases, that exception is too broad and
does indeed go against the Supreme Court's original intent, especially
since Feres directly dealt with two cases entailing medical malpractice in
the consolidated suit. 8 6 There is one main difference between military
personnel and an infant-unborn or born: military personnel consented
to being in the military whereas the infant did not. The Supreme Court in
Feres wanted the Feres Doctrine to expressly to apply to medical
malpractice cases involving military since two of the claims before the
Supreme Court in Feres involved medical malpractice. The Supreme
Court has made other exceptions for non-active duty military personnel,
such as veterans. Any court, but especially the Supreme Court, can
rule that the Feres Doctrine should not apply to injuries incurred to
fetuses or infants receiving medical treatment from military personnel
and Feres would not need to be overturned. With this narrow exception,
the reasons for Feres would still be preserved yet the proper recourse
would be provided to an infant, whether born or still in the womb. Thus,
the Supreme Court should provide clarity to the existing Circuit split and
the ambiguity should be resolved in the infant's favor for reasons
founded in fairness and equity.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, when the Feres Doctrine is applied to negligence
claims brought against the Government for medical malpractice under
the FTCA for injuries that incurred in utero of an active servicewoman,
grave injustice occurs. The original reasoning of the Feres Doctrine is
not kept and the three rationales for the Feres Doctrine are not present.
In order to prevent the injustice that occurs, courts should not apply the
Feres Doctrine and instead should treat the claim as an independent
cause of action brought by a civilian. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
says "Justices continue to think and can change ... I am ever hopeful
185 See Jennifer L. Carpenter, Military Medical Malpractice: Adopt the Discretionary
Function Exception as an Alternative to the Feres Doctrine, 26 U. Haw. L. Rev. 35
(2003); see also Brou, supra note 8, at 53.
18 Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
1 See generally U.S. v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110.
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that if the Court has a blind spot today, its eyes will be open
tomorrow."'
188 Sean Sullivan, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Says Male Justices Have a 'Blind Spot'
on Women's Issues, WASH. POST (July 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/3 l/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-says-male-justices-have-
a-blind-spot-on-womens-issues/.
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